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Recent molecular biology has seen the development of genomics as a successor to
traditional genetics. This paper offers an overview of the structure, epistemol-
ogy, and (very brieºy) history of contemporary genomics. A particular focus is
on the question to what extent the genome contains, or is composed of, any-
thing that corresponds to traditional conceptions of genes. It is concluded that
the only interpretation of genes that has much contemporary scientiªc rele-
vance is what is described as the “developmental defect” gene concept. How-
ever, developmental defect genes typically only correspond to general areas of
the genome and not to precise chemical structures (nucleotide sequences). The
parts of the genome to be identiªed for an account of the processes of normal
development are highly diverse, little correlated with traditional genes, and
act in ways that are highly dependent on the cellular and higher level envi-
ronment. Despite its historical development out of genetics, genomics represents
a radically different kind of scientiªc project.
An ancestor of this paper was written for a symposium on “Proof and
Demonstration in Science and Mathematics.” This presented an immedi-
ate difªculty that I was unsure whether there was anything to be said on
these topics relating to my current areas of study, genetics and genomics.
A version of this paper was presented at the Athens-Pittsburgh Symposium in the History
and Philosophy of Science and Technology in Delphi in June 2003, and beneªted from the
comments of several members of the audience there. I am especially grateful for detailed
comments by Richard Burian, who also helped me to remove some of the more egregious
falsehoods from my Lakatosian history. The support of the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. This work was part of the program of the
ESRC Research Centre for Genomics in Society (Egenis). My thoughts on these topics owe
much to discussions with my colleagues in Egenis. I am especially indebted to Steve
Hughes for continuing education about contemporary genomics. I also thank an anony-
mous referee for pointing out some factual errors.
Perspectives on Science 2004, vol. 12, no. 3
©2004 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Proof, at any rate, is not a concept I often encounter anywhere in biology.
Certainly there is plenty of evidence for some biological claims, but I’m
not sure these generally amount to anything that would count as proof.
Proof in mathematics is a much more familiar idea, but in so far as it
points to a logical relation between axioms and theorems, its application
to contemporary science suggests an antiquated philosophy of science
which, at least in the context of biology, has been almost entirely discred-
ited. There is, of course, a tradition in the philosophy of science of think-
ing of explanations as derivation from laws and initial conditions, which
raises obvious parallels with deduction from axioms. But nowadays philos-
ophers of biology are much more inclined to talk about models than about
laws, and are generally quite skeptical even of the existence of biological
laws (see, e.g., Lloyd 1994).
A quite different connection might be through the use of biological
evidence in juridical contexts. It is often claimed for instance that the
analysis of DNA found at crime scenes provides proof of guilt or inno-
cence. Interesting though such contexts undoubtedly are, and interesting
though the issues they raise in understanding juridical proof may be, I
doubt whether they raise profound philosophical issues in the study of sci-
ence.
Demonstration is, I think, a broader concept, and perhaps holds more
promise. It can, of course, be more or less synonymous with proof, as again
in the context of mathematics and as illustrated by the initials QED
which schoolchildren used to be required to add to the conclusion of what
they fondly hoped were mathematical proofs. In simpler times, demon-
strations were an important part of science pedagogy. A physics teacher
might hang weights of various sizes on a spring, measure the length of the
spring, and plot the length of the spring against the numbers stamped on
the shiny brass weights. Subject only to our conªdence that these numbers
corresponded to a real property of the weights, something rendered intu-
itively plausible by their visible sizes—the one marked 5kg looks quite a
few times as big as the one marked 1kg, for instance—this might reason-
ably be taken as a demonstration of Hooke’s law. If one attends carefully to
the performance, the demonstration, one can more or less see that Hooke’s
law is true (or for the very skeptical, true here, today, anyhow).
In striking contrast to this simple demonstration, I recently had the
good fortune to receive a tour of the Sanger Centre, outside Cambridge,
where a large part of the Human Genome Project, the sequencing (more
or less) of the entirety of the genetic material in a human cell, was carried
out. Over the reception desk an electronic display ºashes a stream of Cs Gs
As and Ts which, we are informed, constitute a real time read out of some
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DNA that is being sequenced somewhere on the premises. Touring the
building where the sequencing actually takes place, the ªrst stop is a room
in which large robots stick tiny probes into Petri dishes and then into
rectangular arrays of test tubes. Spots on the nutrient gel in the Petri
dishes, we are told, contain bacteria infected by viruses with pieces of hu-
man DNA. We next peer through a window in the door of a room con-
taining small but expensive machines that perform the polymerase chain
reaction, the process that multiplies the quantities of DNA generated in
the ªrst process to the quantities required for the sequencing machines.
These latter, ªnally, occupy a warehouse-sized space in which conversation
is rendered difªcult by the hum of the powerful cooling systems. There are
perhaps a hundred of these machines, each connected to a familiar looking
desktop computer, all busily sequencing genomes. The room is largely de-
void of human activity, except for the occasional lab assistant carrying
trays of material to be fed into the machines. A separate building, which I
did not see inside, houses the bioinformatics operation, in which the out-
put of all these machines, and others like them around the world, are
chewed over by powerful computers.
My hour or two touring the sequencing centre might perhaps be re-
ferred to as a demonstration of a state-of-the-art genomics laboratory. But
it is very clearly far removed from the simple demonstration of Hooke’s
law. By contrast with my modest faith that the weights have been accu-
rately labeled, in the Sanger Centre everything is taken on trust. If the en-
tire operation was a mock-up by Lucasªlms, I’m sure I would be none the
wiser.
Perhaps the most interesting moral of this comparison is the way in
which it points to the division of labor in much of modern science.
Though there are of course plenty of biologists who understand the basic
biological principles underlying the various bits of machinery in the se-
quencing lab, it’s a fair bet that few or none of them know in any detail
how all of these machines work. Moreover, even those who know how they
work in some detail surely don’t normally have the expertise in operating
them possessed by experienced technicians familiar with their quirks and
occasional malfunctions. And even those technicians surely don’t have the
expertise of the engineers who design and construct the machines or who
repair them when they malfunction in serious ways.
To cut a long story short, a project such as the sequencing of the human
genome involves the collaboration of thousands of people with hundreds
or thousands of different forms of expertise, not to mention requiring
many years of work by this large and diverse group of people. Clearly no
one could offer a demonstration that the human genome was. . . . One is
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reminded of Descartes’ concern that a proof should be compact enough to
be held in the mind at the same time, though presumably Descartes never
dreamed of anything quite this far from meeting this optimistic ideal. If
one has conªdence that the published drafts of the human genome bear
some close relation to something in reality this is based not on proof or
demonstration, but on trust. And this is as true for Sir John Sulston or
Craig Venter as it is for the casual reader of Nature or tourist in the Sanger
Centre.
No doubt this is all too ambitious. Surely within the practice of genetics
and genomics, as within any human practice with even a minimal intellec-
tual content, there are arguments. For instance:
This gene codes for the Bacillus thuringiensis toxin
If we insert it into the genome of this plant, the plant will produce
BT toxin
BT toxin poisons insect pests
Therefore, if we insert this gene into this plant, the plant will poi-
son insect pests.
This argument is plausible, if a bit enthymematic. One premise that
might start to ºesh it out is:
If we insert a gene for x into a (living) genome then that genome
will produce x.
This premise shows us that the argument, whether or not plausible, is not
sound. For the missing premise is certainly false. There are lots of reasons
for this falsity. One of the most interesting involves the familiar redun-
dancy of the genetic code. Amino acids, the constituents of proteins, are
coded for by as many as six different base-pair triplets. However, different
organisms tend to use different triplets preferentially and will be dispro-
portionately equipped with extra-nuclear equipment for reading the pre-
ferred codons (Ikemura 1981). Consequently they may be very bad at tran-
scribing a gene from a distantly related organism. More simply, whether a
sequence is transcribed will depend very much on where it ends up in the
genome, on its spatial relations to other genes, especially promoter and
suppressor sequences, and even to other structures in the cell. Current
techniques for inserting genes into alien genomes are thoroughly hit or
miss as far as where the genes end up.
Another reason that the gene may fail to produce the toxin is that the
plant may die before it has a chance to do so. If the inserted gene should
land in the middle of a sequence of the genome vital for the plant’s func-
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tioning then the plant will not function. Inserted genetic material may
also have a range of effects on the host organism distinct from those in-
tended (pleiotropy), and these may be harmful or fatal.
The relevant moral of these genomic factoids is that genomic events
are diverse and speciªc. One familiar model of scientiªc argument, that
most closely connected to mathematical ideas of proof and demonstration,
essentially involves generalizations—traditionally thought of as scientiªc
laws—and generalization is a risky business in biology generally and ge-
netics in particular. The simple example just discussed illustrates the
difªculty. The attempt to convert such simple generalizations into
exceptionless laws would be extremely difªcult if not impossible. Such
considerations lead naturally to the conclusion that there are few if any
laws that apply to genes.
And there is an even more basic reason for the lawlessness of genes: as I
shall explain shortly, it is doubtful whether there are any genes at all. My
point so far is not, of course, that no one engaged in genetics or genomics
ever deploys any kind of argument. My thesis is rather that argument has
no special role in genetics beyond that which it plays in any other intelli-
gent human activity. There are no general patterns of argument to be
found, certainly no premises that recur across indeªnitely many different
genetic arguments.
One of the reasons for the lack of such recurring premises is that genes,
the apparent subject matter of genetics, if they should be said to exist at
all, are highly diverse entities and not the kinds of things that might be
the subjects of broad generalizations. We can, perhaps refer relatively
unproblematically to whole genomes. A biologist colleague likes to deªne
the genome as “a space in which genetic things happen.”1 Genes are then,
perhaps, the things that things happen to in genomes. But all kinds of
different things happen in genomes, and they happen to different kinds
of things. Generality in genetics and genomics applies to some interesting
extent to the tools, techniques, and instruments that can be used to
provide insight into genetic events. But genetic events themselves are
hardly more homogeneous than, say, things seen through a telescope, or a
microscope.
A more positive way of stating the point is the following. Traditional
philosophy of science sees central concepts as opening up the possibility of
discovering laws of nature or, at any rate, general knowledge of nature.
The example of genes suggests something quite different: the function of
this concept is rather to allow us to talk about lots of different things (see
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1. Thanks to Steve Hughes for this illuminating idea.
Rheinberger 2000 for a related account of the term “gene”). Such a con-
cept facilitates communication between people with different but related
concerns, and facilitates continuity between successive historical inquiries.
It may also provide a risk of serious misunderstanding. This risk is proba-
bly minimal in the case of working scientists communicating their results
to one another, as far more speciªc, local interpretations of a word such as
“gene” will be expected and provided. Misunderstanding arises rather as
scientiªc results disseminate to different areas either of science or to other
domains of human life, and such dangers may be exacerbated by obsolete
philosophy of science. At any rate, there is a likely role for philosophers of
science in attempting to delineate the diversity of meanings of such com-
plex concepts and the fact that such meanings are diverse.
Are there genes?
Understanding the problems with the concept of a gene requires a brief
excursion into scientiªc history, though I’m afraid the present excursion
will be somewhat Lakatosian in character.2 We might begin the Laka-
tosian enterprise by imagining that Mendel invented the term gene (the
footnote attributes this to Willhelm Johannsen, in 1909). At any rate, the
tradition of transmission genetics generally supposed to have been in-
spired by Mendel’s work, and epitomized by the famous Drosophila experi-
ments of Morgan and Müller, was concerned with genes as hypothetical
factors responsible for differences in phenotypes. The gene for red eyes was
whatever caused some ºies but not others to have red eyes. Of course, no-
body supposed that this was the complete cause, as if the gene was some-
thing that you could dump in the laboratory disposal bin, and the bin
would grow red eyes. But it was the factor that caused the difference in the
developmental process that led to the animal having its distinctive eye
color.
Inevitably this program inspired an interest in the question, what (if
anything) is the physical instantiation of these hypothetical factors. Atten-
tion quite quickly focused on chromosomes as the likely location for
genes, and in 1927 Müller provided evidence for this hypothesis by estab-
lishing that x-ray damage to chromosomes could produce genetic changes
in ºies. In 1944 Oswald Avery argued that the physical basis of heredity
was DNA on the basis of experiments in which DNA was transferred from
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2. Lakatos (1980) famously suggested that history of science should mainly be con-
cerned with “rational reconstruction” of what should have happened to best explain the
current state of our knowledge, with the actual history conªned to the footnotes. Perhaps
unlike Lakatos, I do not mean to imply any disrespect for the very important business of
real history. Unfortunately I am not equipped to provide it.
pathogenic bacteria into a harmless related species, and thereby transmit-
ted the pathogenicity. This, however, remained controversial. In 1953, as
we all know, Crick, Watson, and others disclosed the chemical structure of
DNA, and the basis of its capacity for replication. This quite quickly es-
tablished consensus on the identiªcation of DNA as the genetic material.
In 1966, ªnally, the genetic “code” was “cracked,” and the basis of the
ability of strands of DNA to determine the production of speciªc poly-
peptide chains was understood.
In an obvious sense the elucidation of the structure of DNA was the
culmination of the project of transmission genetics. But it was also, in a
less obvious sense, the beginning of the end of that project—for it initi-
ated the process of seeing that there really weren’t any Mendelian genes, or
anyhow not many. This was in fact the conclusion of discussion that might
perhaps be said to have inaugurated contemporary philosophy of biology,
the question whether the Mendelian gene could be reduced to the molecu-
lar gene. The argument that it could not was stated in David Hulls’ classic
introduction to the philosophy of biology in 1974. The already uncontro-
versial central premise of Hull’s argument was that the relations between
molecular genes and phenotypic traits were many/many. A typical molec-
ular gene would have a variety of effects on the phenotype, and any
phenotypic trait would require numerous molecular genes for its realiza-
tion. So the characterization of genes in terms of their phenotypic effects
seems drastically underdetermined.
This is, to put it mildly, a simpliªed story. As I already noted, classical
geneticists did not typically have crassly naïve views of the role of genes
and intended only to refer to differentiating causes (see, e.g., the sophisti-
cated discussion of the developmental relations between gene and trait in
Morgan et al. 1915). The point about many/many relations does not show
that a molecular gene may not, under normal conditions perhaps, make
the difference between one phenotypic condition and another.
But there is a more important point. The initiation of the program of
molecular genetics inevitably directed attention towards development:
what are the processes by which genes affect the development of the or-
ganism. From the point of view of development, the question of genetic
difference is only of tangential interest. It’s of more fundamental interest
to see how the eye develops at all than to know why it should be red, pur-
ple, orange, or crimson. And many or most of the genes involved in nor-
mal development aren’t even candidates for Mendelian genes, because they
are required for development, and the only distinguishable phenotypic
state connected to variations in such genes is non-viability
The importance of the relation of Mendelian and molecular genes is a
concern that the Mendelian tradition might seem to license a general pro-
326 Understanding Contemporary Genomics
gram of identifying genes in terms of their phenotypic effects. (This is a
version of what Lenny Moss [2002] has described as the preformationist
conception of the gene—the gene as carrying the information necessary
and sufªcient for the production of a particular trait.) Of course, this is the
only way that the tradition could possibly identify genes and it would be
quite unfair to accuse its exponents of making any such ungrounded uni-
versal claim. Still, what we do see is why there is a strong discontinuity
between the Mendelian and molecular traditions. This is just that while
the tradition gave access to some of the molecular phenomena, and moti-
vated the search for the molecular phenomena, the phenomena that that
search ultimately revealed were not even generally the kinds of things that
Mendelian genetics had investigated.
So what is a molecular gene? The natural move in the light of the ªrst
decade or so of information about the actual function of DNA was to sug-
gest that a gene was a bit of DNA that contained the code for producing a
functional polypeptide, or protein. Thus the connection would be main-
tained with some product for which the gene was responsible, but the
product would be identiªed much nearer to DNA itself in the causal
chain. As a matter of fact, it is quite common to hear this conception of
the gene defended to this day (for a sophisticated version of this sort of
view, see Waters [1994]).
This conception of the gene is, however, of little general use for analyz-
ing the genome. To begin with, possibly as much as 95% of the human
genome (proportions vary for different species) doesn’t appear to code for
anything or even to have any function at all, and this is often referred to as
“junk” DNA. Of course having no known function is not the same as hav-
ing no function, and it remains possible that all kinds of further functions
may be discovered. It seems increasingly likely that the three-dimensional
structure of the whole genome may be functionally important, in which
case some or most “junk” DNA will be functionally relevant to maintain-
ing this structure. If there is genuine junk in the genome, it is an interest-
ing speculation that this is the DNA to which Richard Dawkins’ notori-
ous conception of “the selªsh gene” may really apply: this is DNA that
exists because it has successfully competed for space in the genome. From
the point of view of the organism it is a mere parasite. All this is, however,
perhaps a rather minor issue. If, to use a standard abusive expression, the
genome were composed of genes “like beads on a string,” then all the pres-
ence of junk DNA would show would be that there turns out be a lot of
string and not so many beads.
Even within the 5% of the genome that seems deªnitely to be func-
tional, only about 60% is both transcribed into RNA and translated into
polypeptide chains. There are, in addition, sequences involved in a variety
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of ways in promoting, suppressing, terminating, and activating other se-
quences. So only about 3% of the genome even holds out the hope of
ªtting the deªnition under consideration. But even this modest target can
quickly be seen to be unreachable. Sequences identiªed as “genes,” it now
appears, are typically composed of alternating coding sequences and se-
quences which, while often functional, are not part of the sequence for
which the gene as a whole codes. These are known, respectively, as exons
and introns. All or some of the exons, ªnally may be transcribed and then
assembled into a variety of distinct and often functionally different pro-
teins, sometimes employing in addition coding sequences from other parts
of the genome.
A ªnal point, the importance of which is increasingly being realized is
that there are variably transient, but heritable, changes to the genome,
that can have major functional consequences. Most important of these is
the process of “methylation” a modiªcation of the cytosine molecule, one
of the bases in the DNA sequence, that affects the activity of a particular
coding sequence. The importance of this process is currently being ex-
plored in the “Epigenome Project,” one of the main successors to the hu-
man genome project. This phenomenon emphasizes the extent to which
DNA is increasingly perceived as interacting with other elements in the
cell, and indeed indicates the accelerating demise of the one time “central
dogma” of molecular biology that postulated a strictly unidirectional ºow
of information from DNA to RNA to protein.
Without going too deeply into these complexities, what emerges can
also be seen as a recurrence of the many/many problem that derailed
reductionist aspirations for the relation between phenotypes and geno-
types. Even between DNA sequences and polypeptides there are many/
many relations: a DNA sequence may be involved in the production of a
variety of polypeptides, and the production of a polypeptide will normally
involve a variety of often spatially distinct DNA sequences. One
thought—more likely to occur to a philosopher than a biologist, I sus-
pect—is that one might still maintain the principle one polypeptide, one
gene (though not vice versa) and simply recognize that genes had proved
to be overlapping and spatially discontinuous entities.3 But even apart
from the rather serious objection that this will overturn most or all exist-
ing genetic nomenclature, it fails for more technical reasons. The processes
of polypeptide assembly do not necessarily end with translation from
RNA to amino acid chain. One salient case is that of chains that split into
smaller units after translation. Sometimes these units are identical, some-
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3. This idea is discussed, and the difªculties explained, in detail by Fogle (2000).
times different. In the latter case it appears that we must ªnd some way of
avoiding the conclusion that all the polypeptide fragments are products of
the same gene. Any way we ªnd of doing this is likely to force us to say
that the identical products in the former case all are products of different
genes. The point is just that the diversity of the processes intervening be-
tween DNA sequence and functional protein is such as to make it an un-
promising venture to look for some uniform relation between the latter
and some privileged part of the former held to have a canonical causal re-
sponsibility for it. So, it appears that we cannot use the protein products
to base a taxonomy of bits of the genome, and the problem of dividing the
genome into genes remains unanswered.
To recapitulate: Mendelian genes, postulated causes of differences be-
tween conspeciªc organisms are, at the molecular level, scarce and equivo-
cal. They are scarce not only because a large proportion of the genome does
not even contain candidates for Mendelian genes, but also because much of
that which does cannot vary in functionally signiªcant ways without fa-
tally derailing the development of the organism. And they are equivocal
because genes are pleiotropic, having a range of different effects on the or-
ganism. If we think of genes as “made molecular,” as the components of
the genome, then Mendelian principles are of little use in delimiting
genes.
If, on the other hand, we start with the concrete physical genome, we
might perhaps think of genes as the functional constituents of the ge-
nome. Unfortunately from this perspective, the delineation of genes ap-
pears to be massively underdetermined. There are many different kinds of
such functional constituents and, moreover, functional constituents them-
selves have smaller functional constituents. Is an exon a gene? An intron?
For that matter, why not a base pair?
If the Mendelian gene concept is largely inapplicable and the molecular
gene concept hopelessly indeterminate, it begins to look as if we would do
well not to talk about genes at all.
One reason this may sound surprising is that we not only talk about
and hear about genes on a daily basis, but we even learn with considerable
regularity that scientists have discovered them. We are naturally inclined
to attempt to make sense of this talk. I suggest that most of this talk as-
sumes a concept that has not been sufªciently recognized, what might be
called the developmental defect concept.4
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4. An anonymous referee correctly pointed out that the following discussion considers
only deleterious germline mutations, whereas the concept of genetic disease also extends to
disease caused by somatic cell mutations. It would be possible to insist that somatic cell
It is not uncommon for discussions of behavioral genetics to establish
the credentials of their subject by referring to the genetic disorder
phenylketoneuria (PKU). This condition involves the inability to metabo-
lize phenylalanine. The accumulation of this amino acid leads, in turn, to
various physical problems and a degree of mental retardation. The disor-
der is caused by any of a range of mutations in both alleles of the sequence
that codes for the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase. The pathological
condition, PKU, is commonly thought of as a monogenic disease. This, in
turn, is naturally interpreted as meaning “a disease caused by a single
gene.” But we can immediately see that this isn’t quite right. The disease
is caused by the disfunctionality of a particular gene. And the various mu-
tations that lead to such disfunctionality are not in any natural sense genes
for PKU but dysfunctional variants in a genetic region that codes for
phenylalanine hydroxylase. The referent of the phrase “gene for PKU”
therefore is not a physical object at all, but a set of defects in another ob-
ject, a coding region involved in the production of a particular protein.
There is, I suppose, a technical interpretation of the phrase “gene for x” ac-
cording to which any of these defective regions is a gene for PKU: the de-
fective allele makes a difference to the developing phenotype. No one of
them, however, is the gene for PKU. But there is not even a technical sense
in which the functionally unimpaired version of the gene is a gene for the
prevention of PKU. (It does of course function in the production of
phenylalanine hydroxylase, but we have already considered the reasons
why it would be misleading to call it the gene for phenylalanine hydroxy-
lase.) Compare with this the idea that the heart is an organ for preventing
oxygen-deprivation induced brain damage.
It is striking that perhaps the most familiar roughly Mendelian human
physiological trait is a nice example of the developmental defect gene con-
cept, namely eye color.5 Blue eyes are, roughly speaking, the result of a re-
cessive genetic defect in the production of the pigment that gives eyes
their proper brown color. Since in Northern latitudes this defect has no se-
rious consequences, such defects have accumulated in some populations to
the point where blue eyes have become the norm. But there is no gene for
blue eyes in the rather strong sense that the cause of this trait is a pure ab-
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mutations can be included under a sufªciently broad conception of development. However,
given the clear distinction between these cases it is no doubt better to distinguish them,
and recognize a wider range of applications of the term “genetic disease.” I do not think
this correction signiªcantly affects the philosophical argument here (and nor, I am pleased
to say, did the referee).
5. As usual, this example is really much more complicated as there is also a gene for
green eyes, and not all color variation has been genetically explained.
sence. There is a little more to be said for talking about a gene for brown
eyes, though certainly all the standard problems of pleiotropy, polygeny,
and so on will make the terminology liable to mislead.
When we refer to a “gene for x” it is natural to suppose that we are re-
ferring to a gene the physiological function of which is to produce x. If be-
havioral genetics is the study of forms of behavior caused by identiªable
genes, then PKU is completely irrelevant to the subject. The same is
equally true for familiar physiological disorders. We can, of course, insist
on using the phrase “gene for x” in a different technical sense derived from
Mendelian genetics and also adopted by some evolutionists. The problem
then is that behavioral genetics will have only the slimmest connection
with the causes of behavior. My own reading of the evidence is that there
is, in fact, little reason to expect that genetic differences will be useful in
explaining behavioral or mental differences beyond the cases of serious in-
capacity caused by malfunctioning genes. This would, indeed, make the
developmental defect gene concept the appropriate one in this context,
but would also undermine most of the publicly expressed pretensions for
this ªeld of study. To take one example, it was recently widely reported in
the press that the gene for human arts and culture had been found. The
consilient evidence for this claim was, ªrst, that a gene had been isolated
with a mutation that occurred subsequent to the split of the human lin-
eage from that of the great apes; and, second, that damage to this gene
caused people to be deªcient in artistic and cultural skills. I hope it is clear
that this does not provide the slightest shred of an argument for the dis-
covery of a gene for arts and culture in any normal interpretation of that
expression.
Let me offer one more simplistic summary of the simplistic historical
narrative. For much of its history genetics was driven by a hypothetical
kind that it saw itself as investigating, the gene. As we gradually
identiªed the material referent of this hypothetical kind and were able to
learn something about how its instances worked and what they did, it be-
came increasingly clear that they were not a kind at all but a diverse set of
molecular objects and processes. There is perhaps a legitimate kind, DNA
sequence, and some instances of this kind do indeed do something inter-
esting: they are transcribed into RNA sequences, some of which are trans-
lated into proteins.
I won’t go into much detail here about positive accounts of the gene. A
number of accounts have been offered by people who have come to terms
with the sort of complexities just discussed. Most of these, in my view,
have the fatal defect of legislating a concept much narrower than historical
conceptions of the gene and a concept too closely tied to a particular theo-
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retical idea.6 At the opposite extreme, and rather more promisingly,
Hans-Jorg Rheinberger (2000) has suggested that central scientiªc con-
cepts, like the gene, function precisely by remaining sufªciently vague to
allow communication between all the various groups that have an interest
in talking about such things, but very diverse accounts of what it is they
are talking about.
I do think there must be something right about this view. However it
does at least need supplementation to account for the great precision with
which particular genes are referred to in narrow scientiªc contexts. I shall
offer a rather different tentative suggestion. There are interesting parallels
with a topic I have been interested in for many years, the so-called species
problem. It seems almost indisputably impossible to ªnd a deªnition of
the species that is applicable across the whole range of biological diversity.
There are partisans for a variety of species concepts, and these supporters
take various attitudes to the bits of the biological world they don’t ade-
quately cover (they’re not important; more research is needed; they don’t
form species at all; etc.) An inevitable, and in my view correct, reaction to
all this is pluralism: there is no deªnition of species and groups of various
kinds should qualify. Most pluralists nevertheless try to hang on to some
theoretical core to the concept, generally that a species have some kind of
phylogenetic coherence.7
My own preference is for total abandonment of such theoretical com-
mitment. One reason for this is the insistence that “species” is not primar-
ily a theoretical concept at all, but a classiªcatory concept. (Certainly this
accords with the principle of priority, which is an important one within
scientiªc taxonomy.) It is naturally assumed that these will coincide, as
seems to be the case, for example, with the classiªcation of chemical ele-
ments. But the path to pluralism reveals that this is not in fact the case for
biological kinds. One is driven to pluralism by the realization that theo-
retical principles that seem to work nicely for some domains of biological
classiªcation turn out to be wholly inapplicable to others, so that attempts
to provide a monistic account of what a species is leave us unable to clas-
sify large areas of biological diversity. When theoretical conceptions of the
species are applied to practical taxonomy, theory can even become an en-
emy of classiªcation. Changes in theory will lead to change in classiªca-
tion and stability is an obvious desideratum of a classiªcatory scheme.
Taxonomic conservatism must be recognized as an important criterion in
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7. My views on this topic are explained in detail in Dupré (2002), chs. 3 and 4.
assigning species names to groups of organisms, and even more so when it
is recognized that there is no universally adequate theoretical conception
to which classiªcation should be answerable.
Turning now to the naming of genes, I was struck recently by the fol-
lowing sentences on a major bioinformatics website:
“Keeping stable names for “things,” such as genes, in databases is
very important. This allows scientists in different labs around the
world to be conªdent they are all referring to the same thing.
Ensembl goes to great lengths to try to maintain stable names
for genes and other features in the genome.”8
(Ensembl Naming Conventions. From Ensembl website database.)
The diversity of kinds of entity and the desirability of taxonomic stability
seem exactly to mirror the issues that arise for the case of species. So my
proposal is for an atheoretical pluralism similar to that which I advocate
for species: a gene is any bit of DNA that anyone has reason to name and
keep track of. Genes may be proper parts of other genes; they may overlap;
they may have non-contiguous parts, perhaps on two or more chromo-
somes. And, as illustrated for the case of developmental defect genes,
“gene” may even refer to a functionally connected class of DNA segments.
My conclusion is that there are genes—an important point given how
much people talk about them—but that the price of this is conceding that
it doesn’t take much to be a gene. Not much, but not nothing either. I am
assuming that genes are real material entities. Many of the genes discussed
by behavioral geneticists for instance, may well not even meet this mini-
mal condition.
Some Consequences
One conclusion I would like to draw from this recognition of the diversity
of the referent of the term “gene” is a familiar one in contemporary philos-
ophy of biology. It is that the traditional philosophy of science that sees
science as ultimately concerned with the articulation of wide-ranging and
fundamental truths—laws of nature, for instance—has little relevance to
biology. Genetics and genomics offer little project of such general truths
because of the diversity of their subject matter. Recalling Rheinberger’s
suggestion mentioned above, it may be that the function of the most gen-
eral terms in such sciences is precisely to compensate for the lack of such
general truths by allowing some degree of communication between people
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with varying interests in the workings of, for example, the genome. Simi-
larly, I suggest, the term “species” is useful in allowing people with differ-
ent interests in the classiªcation of organisms, different principles for ac-
complishing this, and consequently different groups of organisms to
which they need to refer, nevertheless to understand when reference is be-
ing made to a group of organisms at a certain important level in the taxo-
nomic hierarchy. The great diversity of the subject matter of biology calls
for the most central terms not to be those in terms of which laws can be
formulated, but rather those which are tolerant enough in their reference
to bridge the divides between the various phenomena in which local com-
munities of researchers may be interested. There are, I suppose, some gen-
eral truths about DNA that make it possible for DNA to constitute genes,
but there are lots of ways for bits of DNA to be genes of various kinds, and
all of these depend on the relations between bits of DNA and other things
to which they are related.
It is, as I have noted, hardly a novel suggestion that the view of science
as the search for universal laws is of little or no relevance to biology, but
the extent to which this suggestion has been reinforced by recent develop-
ments in genetics has not yet been fully appreciated. Indeed, it is still
sometimes imagined that the annoying failure of biology to generate
law-like generalizations is a consequence merely of its continuing concern
with complex and variable structures, and its concomitant failure to get
down to the real action at the molecular, and ultimately even more funda-
mental, levels.
One moral of my preceding remarks is just that no such consequences
result as we investigate the inner structures of biological things. On the
contrary, what we ªnd as we become more familiar with molecular pro-
cesses is a diversity of structure and action quite comparable with that
which we ªnd at more complex levels. We are far from approaching the
few simple laws that earlier theorists imagined might reduce complexity
and diversity to order and uniformity.
My argument here is not in any simple way anti-reductionist. It is clear
in genetics that enormous illumination and insight has come from our
ability to investigate and describe molecular processes. It is, however,
anti-reductionist in the sense of rejecting the hierarchical view of nature
often associated with reductionism. Knowledge of different levels of orga-
nization is complementary, not competing. The molecular view is not a
superior view to, say, the cellular view, and one that in principle should
render the latter obsolete. And the reason for this is simply that the mo-
lecular view is not even separable from the cellular view. There is no possi-
bility of specifying the behavior or function of bits of DNA independently
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of a detailed description of the biological context in which they exist.
Minimally this context will include further genomic and cytological in-
formation. Sometimes the relevant context will be much broader, includ-
ing physiology, ecology, and even sociology. And of course this depend-
ence on context is a large part of why what may look very similar—strings
of DNA—may nevertheless prove to be so diverse.
There is a vision of the cell as a nugget of information suspended in a
soup of dumb and formless goo, a notion that still seems common in pop-
ular presentations of biology, and this vision perhaps best represents the
remaining aspirations of hierarchical reductionism. The extranuclear goo,
in this vision, is no more than the minimal context necessary for the ex-
pression of the structure inherent in the DNA.
But in reality the extranuclear goo is as structured, as rich in informa-
tion, as is the nuclear DNA. The sorts of things bits of DNA can do in-
volve diverse reactions with particular chemicals and structures in the
cell. Biochemistry only becomes molecular biology when it is embedded
in cytology. Lower level knowledge cannot possibly displace higher level
knowledge.
And this, as one ªnal important philosophical moral of our growing
understanding of the cell and the genome, should also make clear the fu-
tility of seeing causality as something always elusively located in lower
levels of order, ultimately ªltering up from the most basic constituents of
matter. What was once the controversial thesis of “downward” causation is
a commonplace in biology. One striking example is the differentiation of
cells in development. All the diverse varieties of cells in multi-cellular or-
ganisms, the liver cells, blood cells, hair cells, and so on, trace their origin
to the same ancestral cell. The explanation of the different developmental
paths leading to these diverse outcomes does not reside in differences in
the DNA, but in the ability of the spatial relations between cells and the
spatial distribution of relevant biologically active substances in the egg
and, later, in different locations in the body to affect differentially the be-
havior of the DNA within different cells. This seems as clear as possible a
case of the behavior of a low level entity being caused by higher level enti-
ties of which it is part. The prejudice in favor of the causal priority of the
small, visible in a range of weak reductionisms and supervenience theses
is, I think, just that, a prejudice.
I don’t know how useful it is to read scientiªc models as political allego-
ries. But it is remarkable how naturally a common picture of the cell ªts
with a hierarchical model of social organization. Command and control in-
heres in a central administration, the genome, and orders are carried out
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by messengers, clerks (transcribing, translating, and so on). The construc-
tion work takes place at various sites decently removed from the seat of
power. Contemporary molecular genetics takes us away from this Stalinist
model towards something more Smithian. The efªciency of the cell is un-
imaginable, from this perspective, without the distribution of specialized
capacities across a very large range of different agents. Command and con-
trol do not descend from the central administration building, but emerge
spontaneously, as if guided by an invisible hand. On the Smithian model
order at the lower level is an order of teleological mechanism: events ªt to-
gether in efªcient ways to produce valued outcomes. Broad generaliza-
tions—like this last one—emerge if at all at higher levels. Empirical eval-
uation of the attempt to provide a science of economics as a set of axioms
and their consequent theorems shouldn’t encourage us to hold out a great
deal of hope for these higher level generalities.
Genetic things, genes in the catholic sense I have advocated, are un-
questionably real. They cause things to happen at the phenotypic level and
intervening levels of biological structure, just as those things cause the ac-
tivation and speciªc action of particular genes. Hence only at many levels
simultaneously can we begin to get a full account of the nature of an or-
ganism.
One ªnal question, the answer to which I hope has been illuminated to
some degree by the foregoing, is why so much contemporary discourse is
replacing the term “genetics” with “genomics.” Genetics, a science of hy-
pothetical entities held to be responsible for inheritance, can be carica-
tured, but not altogether unfairly, as a science developed in accordance
with a reductionist epistemology and a law-seeking methodology. Over
the course of a century genetics led us to a remarkably detailed view of the
genome. Among many remarkable properties of the genome is its total
unsuitability for both this epistemology and this methodology. Genomics,
I am tempted to suggest, is the successor science to genetics that rejects
this obsolete epistemology and methodology.
A more positive way of stating the point recapitulates and largely en-
dorses Rheinberger’s idea. Traditional philosophy of science sees central
concepts as opening up the possibility of discovering laws of nature or, at
any rate, general knowledge of nature. But as I have tried to show,
genomic events are diverse and speciªc and there are few if any laws that
apply to genes. The example of genes suggests something quite different:
the function of this concept is rather to allow us to talk about lots of dif-
ferent things. Such a concept facilitates communication between people
with different but related concerns, and facilitates continuity between suc-
cessive historical inquiries. It also provides a risk of serious misunder-
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standing. This risk is probably minimal in the case of working scientists
communicating their results to one another, as far more speciªc, local in-
terpretations of a word such as “gene” will be expected and provided. Mis-
understanding arises rather as scientiªc results disseminate either to dif-
ferent areas of science or to other domains of human life, and such dangers
may be exacerbated by obsolete philosophy of science. At any rate, there
is a likely role for philosophers of science in attempting to delineate the
diversity of meanings of such complex concepts.
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